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CASENOTES

Anderson Chemical v. Portals Water
Treatment: Ensuring an Inherent Risk of
Business

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Anderson Chemical v. Portals Water Treatment,1 the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia addressed 'the issue of
whether a document executed between two corporations regarding a proposed stock purchase merger and acquisition agreement constituted a
binding contract for the sale of securities or a non-binding letter of intent. Specifically, the court addressed a scenario in which a proposed purchaser of securities in an alleged stock purchase agreement made certain
oral representations that directly contradicted limiting language in a document executed between the proposed seller and purchaser. The seller
then acted in reliance upon the purchaser's representations in preparation for execution of the alleged agreement. When the purchaser ultimately decided not to consummate the alleged agreement, the seller
brought suit claiming that there was an enforceable contract for the sale
of securities between the parties, that the purchaser had breached that
contract, and that the purchaser was liable for the seller's expenses of
1.

768 F. Supp. 1568 (M.D. Ga. 1991).
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preparation.2 In its ruling on the seller's summary judgment motion on
the issue of whether the document executed between the two parties constituted an enforceable contract for the sale of securities or a non-binding
letter of intent, the district court held that the document in question only
constituted a non-binding letter of intent.3 In its ruling, the district court
also considered whether the seller's alleged part performance relieved it
from the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, whether promissory estoppel was available to the seller in its request for relief from the burden
of proving a valid contract, and whether there was fraudulent inducement
in the initial negotiations by the buyer such that summary judgment
would be appropriate as a matter of law.4 The court ruled in defendant
purchaser's favor on these issues.'
On July 31, 1992, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on all but one of the thirteen counts.' The court remanded for
further hearing on the plaintiff seller's claim of fraudulent inducement.

II.

BACKGROUND

Portals Holdings PLC ("Portals") is an international chemical and
water-treatment company with headquarters in the United Kingdom and
several subsidiaries throughout the world. Portals operates in America
through a holding company and through its Illinois-based water-treatment subsidiary, Wright Chemical Company ("Wright"). Due to Wright's
disappointing financial performance, Portals hired an Atlanta-based business broker to find a suitable enterprise for Portals to purchase, ostensibly to bolster Wright's performance. That intermediary contacted Mr.
Richard Anderson, chief executive officer and majority stockholder of Anderson Chemical Company of Macon, Georgia ("Anderson"), and suggested that Portals and Anderson meet to discuss a purchase agreement.
Under a written agreement of confidentiality, the parties began discussions for an acquisition arrangement on July 6, 1987. After several meetings and reciprocal visits to each party's offices, extensive discussions, and
disclosure of confidential operating and financial information, the parties
signed the first and only written agreement on November 9, 1987 in Chi2. Id, at 1577.
3. Id. at 1580.
4. Id. at 1577.
5. Id.
6. Anderson Chem. Co. v. Portals Water Treatment, Inc., No. CIV-88-78-3-MAC (11th
Cir. July 31, 1992) (unpublished opinion).
7. At the time of this vriting, the issue of fraud in the inducement has not been formally
adjudicated.
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cago, Illinois.' These facts were undisputed. Portals agreed to purchase
the three entities under the Anderson umbrella for $13,400,000. 9
On November 14, Anderson assembled its employees in Macon, Georgia
for a sales meeting. During that meeting, Anderson's chief executive officer informed the employees that Portals was purchasing the company.
Anderson's representatives immediately informed its customers of the acquisition and that Anderson intended to conduct its business in the same
manner. 10 Subsequently, pursuant to Item 6 of the document, Anderson
allowed Portals full access to its books and records.
8. 768 F. Supp. at 1570.
9. Id. at 1571. Item 1(a) of the document specified an amount of $13,400,000 and allocated the purchase price percentages among the various entities of the seller. The document
consisted of eleven items, with varying alphabetical subsections. In general, Item 1 confirmed the parties' discussions regarding the proposed purchase, and specified the purchase
price and the capital stock purchase percentages. Item 2 provided that
(ulpon execution by [Anderson] and return to [Portals] of this Letter of Intent,
(Portal's] counsel will prepare a definitive purchase agreement ("Purchase Agreement"), execution of which shall be subject to approval by [Anderson] and the
Board of Directors of Portals and a definitive merger agreement ("Merger Agreement"), execution of which shall be subject to the approvals of the Board of Directors of Portals [and Anderson].
Id. at 1573.
Item 6 provided for Portal's lawyers and accountants to have access to Anderson's premises, books, and records. Id. at 1574. Item 7 provided for the confidentiality of information
furnished to Portals. Id. at 1575. Item 8 obligated Anderson to notify Portals of any other
entity's expressed interest in acquiring Anderson and to continue operations as usual, pending completion of the acquisition. Id. Item 8 further specified that "[tihe parties agree that,
in the event the parties have not entered into the Purchase Agreement and the Merger
Agreement on or before January 31, 1988, the obligations set forth in this paragraph 8 shall
terminate and be of no further force and effect." Id.
Item 9 provided that "[ejach party will bear its own transaction expenses, including legal
and accounting fees, with respect to the matters contemplated hereby." Id. at 1576.
Item 10 provided that
[t]he parties will cooperate with all deliberate speed to sign the Purchase Agreement and Merger Agreement as soon as reasonably possible and close the Stock
Purchase and Merger as soon as reasonably possible. We understand that lAnderson] . . . by [its] execution of this Letter of Intent . . . hereby indicatels] [its]
intent to proceed . . . on the terms set forth herein.
Id.
Finally, Item 11 provided that
[tihis letter constitutes only an expression of intent and shall not constitute a
binding agreement between the signatories to consummate the transaction contemplated hereby. . . . Consummation of the transactions contemplated hereby
is specifically subject to the negotiation and execution of the definitive Purchase
Agreement and Merger Agreement embodying the terms and conditions outlined
herein . . . and finally is subject to approval by the main Board of Directors of
Portals . . . prior to the execution of the Purchase Agreement.
10.

Id. at 1576, 1577.
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At the time the parties drafted the November 9 document, they contemplated preparing and executing a separate definitive purchase agreement. However, the parties never prepared that document. Between November 9 and December 21, 1987, Portal's management reevaluated
Wright Chemical Company's financial condition and, consequently, its
proposal to acquire Anderson. After the holiday season, Portal's management team reconvened and instructed its management in the United
States to inform Anderson of its plans not to consummate the acquisition.
Portal's representatives in the United States informed Anderson of that
decision on January 8, 1988.1 Anderson claimed that, by. relying on Portals' alleged false representation that Portals was earnest in its intent to
consummate the acquisition, Anderson incurred at least $1,700,000 in
transaction-related expenses.12 Anderson filed this lawsuit in federal court
based on diversity jurisdiction with Georgia law controlling. Anderson's
complaint included thirteen counts seeking damages for, among other
things, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and fraud in the
inducement.

8

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S OPINION

Because Anderson premised most, if not all, of its claims on breach of
contract, the initial question facing the court was whether the document
executed on November 9 constituted an enforceable contract for the sale
of securities or whether it constituted a non-binding letter of intent. The
district court held that the document constituted only a non-binding letter of intent. Thus, no contract for the sale of securities existed between
the parties.

1

4

Regarding the alleged formation of a contract, Anderson first contended that the court should search through the depositions and other
exhibits to discover the agreement of which it had been assured. The
court rejected this contention, stating that the document of November 9,
1987 was clear and unambiguous on its face. s Furthermore, the court
cited language from Item 8 as evidence that the agreement did not constitute a binding contract because the parties specified a date beyond which
the agreement would be void:
11. Id.
12. Anderson, No. CIV-88-78-3-MAC, at 8.
13. 768 F. Supp. at 1577.
14. Id. at 1580.
15. Id. at 1578. "When clear and unambiguous, [a) contract is presumed to express the
parties' intentions and will be enforced according to its terms." Id. (quoting Insurance Concepts, Inc. v. Western Life Ins. Co., 639 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1981)).

19931
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In the event either or both parties failed to approve, these provisions
specified a date that ended the efforts to effect agreement and specified
the then remaining obligations of the parties. The parties thus contemplated that they might fail to agree on the terms and conditions of a
definitive purchase and/or merger agreement or might fail to secure the
necessary approval.1

Second, Anderson contended that Item 1017 created a mutual obligation
for the parties to consummate the acquisition. Thus, Anderson maintained, it directly contradicted Item 11.1' The district court flatly rejected
this position, and refused, in effect, to latch on to the first sentence of
Item 10 and find a contract in the face of contrary language. 19
Furthermore, the district court rejected Anderson's argument that its
part performance on the alleged contract, based upon various oral representations by Portals' representatives that the stock purchase was a done
deal, removed the document from the requirements of the Statute of
Frauds.8 Anderson based its position on the fact that, pursuant to Item
10,21 it had divulged significant confidential information to Portals, publicly announced the acquisition, revealed product lines and formulas to
Portals, and allowed Portals to meet with its existing customer base.22
However, the district court cited case law challenging that position:
Under Georgia law, part performance to take an oral agreement out of
the Statute of Frauds, "must be a part performance of the contract, and
the doing by either party of some independent act, not a part of the
contract, does not become a part performance because the doer was led
so to act by his belief that the parol contract would be performed by the
other party; . . . [A]nything done which is outside the limits of the contract . . . is insufficient to cause the case to fall within the exception to
"22
the statute
"Such performance done even upon the advice of the other party does not
alter the rule."'2 4 The district court determined that Anderson's actions
constituted nothing more than "'preparation for performance, and not
part performance of the contract itself.' ",25 Thus, the court determined
16. Id. at 1579.
17. See supra note 9.
18. See supra note 9.
19. 768 F. Supp. at 1580.
20. Id. at 1580-81.
21. See supra note 9.
22. 768 F. Supp. at 1581.
23. Id. (quoting Hotel Candler, Inc. v. Candler, 198 Ga. 339, 347-49, 31 S.E.2d 693, 699700 (1944)).
24. Id. (citing Cofer v. Wofford Oil Co., 85 Ga. App. 444, 450, 69 S.E.2d 674, 679 (1952)).
25. Id. (quoting 85 Ga. App. at 450, 69 S.E.2d at 679).
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that neither Anderson's part performance pursuant to Item 10 nor any
oral representations by Portal's representatives to Anderson's employees,
stockholders, and customers that the proposed stock purchase acquisition
had been officially consummated, removed the document from the Stat26
ute of Frauds.
Finally, the district court rejected Anderson's argument that Portals
was precluded from terminating the acquisition due to promissory estoppel. On this point, Anderson relied on the definition of promissory estoppel as found in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 13-3-44(a):
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for
breach may be limited as justice requires.27
Anderson maintained that the following representations on the part of
Portals' representatives substantiated its actions in reliance on the alleged contract: (1) The language in Item 10 to the effect that the parties
would cooperate with all deliberate speed to consummate the Purchase
and Merger Agreements as soon as reasonably possible;2 8 (2) Portals'
statement that, although it was unwilling to pay earnest money, if Portals
said it would do something, it would go through with it; (3) Portals' representatives on October 23, 1987 telling Mr. Richard Anderson that Portals U.K. had approved the transaction; (4) Portals' representatives telling Anderson's employees and stockholders that Portals had bought the
company; and (5) Portals' representatives stating at a December 10, 1987
meeting that the Purchase Agreement had been worked out, a deal was in
effect, and that there were no open issues."'
In its analysis of Anderson's promissory estoppel argument, the district
court looked directly to the applicable Georgia statute,. O.C.G.A. section
11-8-319(a)-(d) 2 0 The court determined that promissory estoppel did not
apply and was unavailable to Anderson in its effort to escape its burden

26.

27.

Id.

O.C.G.A. § 13-3-44(a) (1982).

28. See supra note 9.
29. 768 F. Supp. at 1581-82.

30. Id. at 1582. O.C.G.A. § 11-8-319 (a)-(d) states:
A contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by way of action or defense

unless:
(a) There is some writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is
sought ... sufficient to indicate that a contract has been made for sale of a

stated quantity of described securities at a defined or stated price;
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of proving an enforceable contract for the sale of securities.3 1 "[I]f promissory estoppel were applicable, [Anderson's) reliance [on Portals' oral
representations] must be reasonable. The question of whether [Anderson's] reliance was reasonable is one for the court to decide" 31 Here, the
district court determined that, because Portals' oral representations di-

rectly contradicted the language in the November 9 agreement, it was unreasonable for Anderson to act in reliance upon them. 3 Furthermore, the
court stated that there was no change in position not specifically contemplated by Item 934 of the document, which provided that each party
agreed to bear its own transaction expenses. 5 In essence, the court determined that Anderson's actions, under the management and supervision of
competent, experienced businesspeople, were ill-advised in light of the
document's specific limiting language, and that Anderson must bear the
financial burden of an unreasonable course of action. As a result, the district court granted Portals' motion for summary judgment on all thirteen
counts.36
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS REVIEW
The court of appeals affirmed on twelve of the thirteen counts against
Portals. However, as the court concluded that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment on Anderson's claim of fraud in the inducement, it vacated that part of the judgment and remanded for further
37

proceedings.

(b) Delivery of a certificated security ... has been accepted,. .. or payment has been made, but the contract is enforceable under this provision
only to the extent of such delivery. . . or payment;
(c) Within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the sale or
purchase and sufficient against the sender under paragraph (a) has been
received by the party against whom enforcement is sought and he has failed
to send written objection to its contents within ten days after its receipt; or
(d) The party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading,
testimony, or otherwise in court that a contract was made for the sale of a
stated quantity of described securities at a defined or stated price.
O.C.G.A. § l1-8-319(a)-(d) (1982 & Supp. 1992).
31. 768 F. Supp. at 1582. See Smith v. Baker, 715 S.W.2d 890 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968);
Thomas v. Prewitt, 355 So. 2d 657 (Miss. 1978).
32. 768 F. Supp. at 1583 (citing Atkinson v. American Agency Life Ins. Co., 165 Ga. App.
102, 105, 299 S.E.2d 600, 603 (1983)).
33. Id.
34. See supra note 9.
35. 768 F. Supp. at 1582-83.
36. Id. at 1584.
37. Anderson, No. CIV-88-78-3-MAC, at 5.
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The law in Georgia is clear. "'[A writing] must be construed by the
court to mean what it says ... [The "language used must be afforded its
literal meaning and plain ordinary words given their usual significance." 1 3 , '[N]o construction is required or permitted where the language of the contract isplain, unambiguous and capable of only one reasonable interpretation.' '" 3 Today's commercial realities dictate that
letters of intent are not only useful, but are often indispensable in facilitating intricate commercial agreements:
A complex business transaction ...requires a significant expenditure of
time, effort, research and finances simply to arrive at its terms. The
books of the companies must be carefully reviewed, difficult judgments of
valuation must be made, financing must be secured, new corporations
may have to be formed .... [O]ther professional services such as accounting and financing may have to be commissioned as well ....
When a deal is necessarily preceded by costly groundwork, a letter of
intent may benefit both the purchaser and the seller ....Neither party
has committed himself to the exchange. Both have agreed to work toward it. While success is not certain, it is more likely and the fear of
wasted or duplicative effort is reduced." On its face, Item 1141 of the November 9 document unambiguously states
that the document "constitutes only an expression of intent and shall not
constitute. a binding agreement between the signatories to consummate
the transaction contemplated hereby . . . . "i4 Furthermore, it clearly
states that "[c]onsummation of the transactions contemplated hereby is
specifically subject to the negotiation and execution of the definitive
Purchase Agreement . . .and finally is subject to approval by the main
Board of Directors .. .prior to the execution of the Purchase Agreement." 8 In light of this language, the court of appeals agreed with the
district court and held that the document constituted a letter of intent,
and that either party was free to suspend its performance.""
Likewise, the district court and the court of appeals held that Georgia's
Statute of Frauds precluded Anderson from establishing a parol agreement from Portals' representations and conduct after signing the November 9 document. A written contract may properly be modified by an oral
38. 768 F. Supp. at 1578 (quoting Porter Coatings v. Stein Steel & Supply Co., 157 Ga.
App. 260, 262, 277 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1981)).
39. Id. (quoting Petroziello v. United States Leasing Corp., EOS Leasing Div., 176 Ga.
App. 858, 861, 338 S.E.2d 63, 66 (1985)).
40. Feldman v. Allegheny Intern, Inc., 850 F.2d 1217, 1221 (7th Cir. 1988).
41. See supra note 9.
42. 768 F. Supp. at 1570.
43, Id.
44. Id. at 1577.
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representation only when the representation is not inconsistent with express or implied conditions of the contract, and is one that the parties
could not reasonably be expected to embody in the writing.' 5 In this case,
however, Portals' alleged representations of a completed acquisition were
completely inconsistent with the express language of the agreement. Regardless of any oral representations to the contrary, the document clearly
stated that the acquisition was predicated upon the execution and approval of subsequent Purchase and Merger Agreements and director approval thereof. As such, "it would frustrate the Statute of Frauds to
search through the depositions in an effort to find [the parties' intent to
be bound].""'
In addition, the district court and the court of appeals held that promissory estoppel should not compel Portals to consummate the acquisition.
The Georgia Statute of Frauds applicable to this proposed securities
transaction does not make promissory estoppel available to Anderson.
Furthermore, "[t]here can be no reasonable reliance by an experienced
business[person] in light of oral representations directly contrary to limiting terms of a written agreement.' 7 It is not the job of the courts to
rescue businesspeople from imprudent business decisions against which a
combination of experience, common sense, and advice of counsel should
advise.
However, the court of appeals did find that the district court erred in
granting Portals' motion for summary judgment on Anderson's claim of
fraud in the inducement. A reasonable inference could be drawn from the
evidence that Portals never actually intended to purchase Anderson and
that Portals entered into negotiations solely to prop up the market price
of Wright, its Illinois subsidiary, for subsequent sale.48 Anderson pointed
to two items at trial to support its fraud claim. First, Portals' management team presented a proposal to its Board of Directors in March 1987,
stating that:
[Ilf the [Wright] overheads are too high for the sales and we cannot reduce overheads or increase sales (quickly enough) our future strategy can
only be a) sell Wright Chemicals or b) buy U.S. water treatment chemical companies to add sales to our operation. We are proposing (b) as our
first choice strategy but if we predict at the end of [the second quarter] a
loss in 1987 of a similar level to 1986, we will move to (a)."'
45. -Booth v. Booth & Bayliss & Commercial Sch., Inc., 180 A. 278 (Conn. 1935).
46. Anderson, No. CIV-88-78-3-MAC, at 10 (citing Beaulieu of America, Inc. v. Coronet
Indus., Inc., 173 Ga. App. 556, 559, 327 S.E.2d 508, 510 (1985)).
47. 768 F. Supp. at 1583 (citing Runnemede Owners, Inc. v. Crest Mortgage Corp., 861
F.2d 1053, 1058-59 (7th Cir. 1988)).
48. Anderson, No. CIV-88-78-3-MAC, at 7.
49. Id. at 6.
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In addition, Anderson pointed to a May 1987 Portals confidential memorandum, stating that "the Portals board had decided to sell Wright in
May 1987, one month before it began negotiating with Anderson."0
The court of appeals held that the district court erred "by misinterpreting Anderson's cause of action" and by concluding that "there could
be no fraud claim because Anderson could not have reasonably relied on
an unenforceable promise.""' Based on the laws of Georgia (the place of
the contract) regarding proof of a claim of fraud
[tihe question ...is not whether Portals made an unenforceable promise. Instead, the proper questions are (1) did Portals falsely represent to
Anderson that it might buy Anderson, (2) did Portals know this representation to be false, (3) did Portals intend to deceive Anderson with this
representation, (4) could Anderson have reasonably relied on this representation, and (5) did Anderson sustain a loss as a proximate cause of
this false representation.2
V. ANALYSIS

The court of appeals properly remanded for further proceedings on Anderson's fraud claim. Based on the March 1987 proposal to Portals' Board
of Directors and the May 1987 confidential memorandum, a genuine issue
of material fact certainly existed as to whether Portals ever intended to
purchase Anderson, or whether the negotiations were commenced simply
to make Wright a more attractive and viable target for acquisition. If
Portals intended the latter, it would constitute fraud in the inducement
of an agreement, and would be actionable for damages in reliance.
Courts should expect experienced, competent businesspeople to use
sound business judgment in their respective dealings. To that end, however, courts certainly cannot expect businesspeople to know, with absolute certainty, the inward motivations of other parties with whom they
deal. Yet, by granting Portals' motion for summary judgment'on Anderson's fraud claim, the district court seems to feel that Anderson failed in
that very responsibility. Commercial realities should not require such a
high degree of risk assumption on the part of businesspeople. It is one
thing to require experienced businesspeople to use sound business judgment in assessing another's capabilities. That responsibility comes part
and parcel with the negotiation process. Nevertheless, it is another matter
entirely to require a .businessperson to assess another's covert intentions.
In business, one can only assess that which is either made known to him
or is discoverable through reasonable investigation. Courts should ac50. Id. at 7.
51. Id. at 8.
52. Id.
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knowledge this commercial reality. In this case, Anderson failed to use
sound business judgment in light of the terms of the document executed
between the parties on November 9. Nonetheless, Anderson deserves the
opportunity to establish that Portals committed fraud in the inducement
by compelling Anderson to act to its detriment while never intending to
consummate the stock purchase. Consequently, the court of appeals properly remanded on the issue of fraud.
VI. CONCLUSION

Courts are designed to redress legitimate grievances when parties have
been injured through the acts of others in contravention of the law. To
that end, however, courts should not serve as a forum for businesses and
corporations with otherwise competent management to seek recovery for
ill-advised and imprudent business decisions. Business necessarily involves a host of risks. One of those risks is, and should be, the inherent
risk of acting in reliance on a proposed transaction without sufficiently
guaranteeing another's reciprocal, bargained for performance. Competent
management, coupled with good legal representation, can and should mitigate that risk.
Courts must recognize that every business bears the risk of making imprudent decisions. The court in Anderson Chemical recognized this.
When owners and managers make business decisions, they necessarily
take calculated risks based upon their knowledge and experience. They
are rewarded for decisions that prove correct, and penalized for those that
prove ill-advised. Courts must continue to recognize that risk is a necessary and indispensable element in the business world, and that the role of
the judiciary is not to remove it altogether. To that end, it is not oversimplification to say that our legal system must continue to allow for one of
the most elemental risks not only of business, but of life, itself, the risk of
exercising poor judgment and having to learn from one's mistakes.
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